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OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF LEGAL RECOURSE:
INTERPRETING AND REVISING TITLE VII TO PROHIBIT
WORKPLACE SEGREGATION BASED ON RELIGION
DAWINDER S. SIDHU 
I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2011, ABC News aired an investigative hidden-camera segment in which
three job applicants—a Jewish man with a yarmulke, a Muslim woman with a hijab, and
a Sikh man with a turban—were denied employment at a restaurant. The employer and
the applicants were played by actors. In front of and within earshot of real-life customers,
the employer rejected the applicants because their religious attire did not conform to the
employer’s dress code policy. 1 For example, the restaurant manager informed the Sikh
applicant that he would not hire him “looking the way you look.” 2 According to the
employer, his turban could be “threatening to anyone sitting here eating.” 3
The purpose of the segment was to ascertain how unsuspecting members of the
public would respond to blatant discrimination based on religious appearance. Some
patrons objected to the restaurant manager for acting in a discriminatory, unfair fashion. 4
One African-American patron likened the employer’s treatment of the Sikh applicant to
discrimination on the basis of race. The patron wondered if the manager could “say it to
me about my color or my religious beliefs. It’s the same thing, right?” 5 Another troubled
witness admonished the manager, “I’m just not sure you’re aware of how illegal it
is….You’re lucky there are no other lawyers around.” 6
As it turns out, the restaurant patrons’ assumption that courts would find such
conduct illegal is mistaken. For years, federal courts have enabled employers to engage in
the behavior depicted in this broadcast. Where there is a conflict between an employee’s
appearance based on his or her religion and an employer’s interest in avoiding negative
customer reaction, federal courts allow employers to resolve this conflict by placing the
religious employee in a position out of public view or by refusing to hire him or her
altogether. According to the courts, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
∗
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See What Would You Do? (ABC News television broadcast May 6, 2011), available at
http://abc.go.com/watch/what-would-you-do/SH5555951/VD55125732/what-would-you-do-56.
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In the case of the woman wearing a hijab, the patrons interviewed in the program exclusively expressed
support for her against the potential employer. However, patrons expressed mixed support for the two male
applicants. Some argued that the men should have to remove their religious attire if the employer had a
conflicting dress code policy, or that they should “fit in” with America, which ostensibly means such
religious attire is not acceptable or appropriate. See id.
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VII”) 7 —which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of several protected
categories, including religion 8 —protects all aspects of religious observance and practice
unless an employer cannot “reasonably accommodate” the practice or observance without
“undue hardship.” 9 Courts have ruled that it is a “reasonable accommodation” of the
employee’s religion to segregate an employee with religious attire—by, for example,
placing him or her in the back room. 10 Courts have also held that hiring such an
employee may result in economic costs that amount to an “undue hardship.” 11
The purpose of this article is to argue that the federal courts’ prevailing
interpretation of Title VII with respect to religious attire in the workplace is inconsistent
with the law. I maintain that Title VII prohibits employers from either placing employees
in the back or refusing to hire individuals with conspicuous articles of faith due to any
actual or perceived social discomfort with the employee’s religion-based appearance. 12 I
am persuaded of this for two independent reasons. First, placing an employee out of
public view does not constitute a “reasonable accommodation” under Title VII because
the statute’s general anti-discrimination provision expressly prohibits employers from
“segregating” employees. 13 There is no basis for suspecting that this clear, broad negative
on employer conduct does not extend to employees whose appearance is dictated by their
religious beliefs. 14 To cure the defect in its approach, I encourage a court sitting in review
of a religion-based segregation case to analyze an employer’s proffered “reasonable
accommodation” in light of this general anti-discrimination provision. In doing so, the
religious rights of employees would be maximized in accordance with their statutory
limits. Second, an employer may not base its decision to segregate an individual with a
religiously-mandated appearance on customers’ possible or demonstrated discriminatory
preferences. 15 Where courts enable employers to rely on such actual or perceived biases,
7

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17 (2006).
See id. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (making it an “unlawful employment practice for an employer” to “fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s. . . religion”).
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Id. § 2000e(j).
For a representative example, see infra Part II.B.2 (discussing Birdi v. United Airlines Corp., No. 99 C
5576, 2002 WL 471999 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2002).
10
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For a representative example, see infra Part II.B.3 (discussing EEOC v. Sambo’s of Georgia, Inc., 530 F.
Supp. 86 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
12
This article is interested in employer decisions based on concerns about customer responses to
conspicuous articles of faith or a desire to maintain a certain public image. Accordingly, this article does
not challenge employer decisions that are based on legitimate, non-religion-based considerations such as
employee health or safety. See Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1383–84 (9th Cir. 1984)
(finding that a Sikh employee with a beard would be exposed to toxic gas since his respirator would not be
able to create a gas-tight seal, therefore, an exemption from the employer’s shaving policy would represent
an undue hardship).
13
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer…(2) to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”)
14
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See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
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they allow employers to give practical effect to those biases. By prohibiting customer
bias from supporting the segregation described, courts would also clarify that religionbased appearance discrimination is on par with and deserves the same treatment as racial
discrimination; in the civil rights era, courts did not permit customer bias to justify
discrimination against African-Americans. While employers may contend that their
practices reflect non-discriminatory corporate identities rather than customer stereotypes,
in my estimation this sleight-of-hand falls flat—a corporate “brand” simply codifies and
reflects consumer preferences, including stereotypes. 16
This article does more than offer a legal argument for why federal courts must
modify their existing interpretation of Title VII. 17 As federal courts have consistently
read Title VII to permit such segregation despite the text and purpose of the statute—as
well as applicable lessons from the nation’s painful experience with racial
discrimination—I also write in support of the pending Workplace Religious Freedom Act
(WFRA) of 2010. 18 In part, this bill would prevent employers from using Title VII to
justify an “out of sight, out of mind” model by amending the statute to explicitly prohibit
the “segregation of an employee from customers or the general public.” 19 This language
in effect would ban employers from catering to public image concerns by removing
individuals with religious attire from public view.
The term “segregation” is most commonly used in the context of race, and
accordingly, triggers strong, visceral feelings. I acknowledge and appreciate these
emotions, and recognize that some readers may object to the use of the term
“segregation” beyond the boundaries of race. With due consideration to this instinctive
reaction, I believe “segregation” may be used judiciously and appropriately whenever
individuals are separated from others solely because of some identifiable characteristic.
The use of the term “segregation” in this article does not intend to minimize its meaning
in the context of race, but attempts to establish a bridge between our nation’s history of
racial intolerance and a modern iteration of segregation.
By placing employees with conspicuous religious appearances out of public view,
or by not hiring such applicants, employers engage in a practice of segregation. This
segregation takes two forms. Both lead to the physical separation and isolation that are
the touchstones of the term. First, when an employer places an employee with religious
attire in the “back,” out of public view, it designates a distinct physical space that an
employee is restricted to only because of his or her religious appearance, and necessarily
a separate area where employees without this appearance are free to associate and
congregate. Second, when individuals are denied positions on account of their religious
16

Id.
The two independent reasons cited above are internal to Title VII. That is, I argue that Title VII on its
own terms does not justify the segregation of individuals with conspicuous religious attire. For a
recommendation that Title VII should import the heightened “undue hardship” standard from the
Americans with Disabilities Act, see Sadia Aslam, Note, Hijab in the Workplace: Why Title VII Does not
Adequately Protect Employees from Discrimination on the Basis of Religious Dress and Appearance, 80
UMKC L. REV. 221, 236 (2011).
18
S. 4046, 111th Cong. (2010).
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See id. § (4)(a)(3).
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appearance, they are left outside of the workforce and removed from the spheres of
human intercourse that are inherent in employment. In short, as used here, segregation is
both within the workplace and from the workplace.
To prove why Title VII should not permit such religion-based segregation, Part II
of this article provides an overview of Title VII’s legal standards as they relate to
discrimination on the basis of religion. In addition, I describe, for illustrative purposes,
two decisions in which the federal courts held that Title VII does not prohibit the
segregation of Sikh employees who wear turbans. Part III argues that such segregation is
not permitted by Title VII, based on the text and purpose of Title VII, the effect of
segregation in promoting majoritarian norms and perpetuating harmful stereotypes, and
principles from other historical and civil rights contexts. Part IV discusses the
implications of this argument by addressing its relationship to the Supreme Court’s
religious discrimination decisions in the constitutional context as well as the function of
the courts in checking employer behavior.
Before proceeding further, it is important to set forth why this inquiry into
appearance-based treatment of religious individuals is necessary. First, employment
discrimination against individuals on the basis of appearance is pervasive. A 2005 survey
by the Employment Law Alliance found that 16 percent of workers believed they had
been subject to appearance-related discrimination.” 20 This figure is comparable to the
percentage of individuals who identify as victims of sex-based discrimination or racial
discrimination. 21 Recent cases also exemplify the prevalence of appearance-based
discrimination. In Wal-Mart v. Dukes, recently decided by the Supreme Court, 22 a former
female Walmart employee alleged that she was told by a manager to “blow the cobwebs
off” her make-up and “doll up” in order to advance in the company. 23
Second, if Title VII does not reject segregation of the sort addressed in this article,
it calls into question the promise and effectiveness of a statute designed to safeguard
employees from discrimination on the basis of religion.
Third, workplace segregation is not solely a provincial concern. It is not
exclusively committed by small “Mom and Pop” employers or companies in rural
settings. Large, national corporations—such as Subway, Alamo Rent-a-Car, and Jiffy
Lube, among others—have allegedly engaged in workplace segregation on the basis of
religion. 24 For example, a Sikh musician with a beard, long hair, and turban alleged that
20

Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1060 (2009).
Id. at 1060–61.
22
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). The issue before the Court was not whether the
employer was liable for discrimination on the merits, but rather whether the plaintiffs were sufficiently
common such that class action certification is appropriate. The Court held that such certification was not
consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing class action claims. See id.
23
Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint at ¶ 65, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal.
2004), 2002 WL 33645690.
24
See Ali v. Alamo Rent-a-Car, 8 F. App’x 156 (4th Cir. 2001); EEOC v. Alamo Rent-a-Car, 432 F. Supp.
2d 1006 (D. Ariz. 2006); Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 419 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D. Mass. 2006); see also
Subway Restaurant Owner Told Wearing Turban Violates Subway Policy, SIKH COALITION, Apr. 2005,
available at http://www.sikhcoalition.org/advisories/sldf0405.htm (profiling the matter of a Sikh Subway
franchisee who was told by a corporate inspector “that he would have to start wearing a Subway cap
21
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he was rejected for a position at Walt Disney World for not possessing the “Disney
look.” 25 Disney described the necessary look as “a fresh, clean and approachable look,
ensuring that every guest feels comfortable with our entire cast.” 26 If many large
companies engage in such segregation, it is reasonable to believe that the universe of
individuals potentially subject to workplace segregation is quite large.
Fourth, one can imagine that appearance-based discrimination would be roundly
condemned if the individuals were segregated due to their race, gender, or ethnicity. 27
Discrimination against individuals with prescribed religious appearances should meet
with the same reaction and receive the same protection. The United States is a nation
built on the notion of religious freedom. 28 The outward representation of an individual’s
religious beliefs is in effect religion made tangible or observable. Protecting employers
who discriminate on the basis of an individual’s religious appearance signals the
weakening of religious liberty, an otherwise first-order object of American law and
society.
Finally, and most broadly, society’s acceptance or abhorrence of workplace
segregation defines the type of community in which we live. It asks us to determine
instead of his turban and reported to local headquarters that Harbans was in violation of company policy
because he was wearing a turban.”); Marina Jimenez, Second manager complains of discrimination:
Subway Restaurants faces criticism over prohibition against turban-wearing, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Dec.
26, 2003, A18 (“Another manager of a Subway Restaurants franchise in Edmonton has come forward with
a complaint of religious discrimination, alleging an official of the sandwich chain refused to let him wear
his turban while serving customers.”).
25
See scottpowers, Sikh Musician Sues Disney World Over “Disney Look,” Discrimination, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (June 16, 2008, 11:05 AM),
http://blogs.orlandosentinel.com/business_tourism_aviation/2008/06/sikh-musician-s.html (explaining that
while the applicant believes he was rejected because of his appearance, Disney maintains that the applicant
was rejected because he did not reapply for the position).
26
Janna Oberdorf, The Secret Behind the Magic of Disney, NYULIVEWIRE,
http://journalism.nyu.edu/publishing/archives/livewire/archived/the_secret_behind_the_magic_of (last
visited Sept. 16, 2011).
27
See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964). See also my discussion of the case, infra
note [xxx] and accompanying notes. To be sure, alleged appearance-based discrimination has been upheld
where courts construe the element of appearance at issue (e.g., a hairstyle) as a personal preference and not
an immutable extension or manifestation of racial identity. See Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Inc., No. 7:06CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306 at *6 (M.D.Ga. 2008); Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 232
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also Eatman v. United Parcel Serv., 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(rejecting the Title VII claim, but stating that, “[i]t is not impossible to imagine a situation in which a
frivolous appearance guideline so disparately impacts a protected class that a jury could infer from the
existence of that situation alone that the employer adopted the guideline as a ‘subterfuge for
discrimination’”). I suggest, however, that mandated religious appearance is akin to an immutable trait,
such as race itself, and thus should be similarly viewed and treated as racial segregation.
28
See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 413 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I am convinced that no
liberty is more essential to the continued vitality of the free society which our Constitution guarantees than
is the religious liberty protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.”); Abington Sch.
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (“The place of religion in our society is an exalted one,
achieved through a long tradition of reliance on the . . . inviolable citadel of the individual heart and mind.
We have come to recognize through bitter experience that it is not within the power of the government to
invade that citadel. . . .”).
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whether social space should be reserved exclusively for members of majority groups or
whether we should include individuals of all backgrounds and beliefs. Unless the Court
or Congress alters the current interpretation of Title VII, employers may continue to
reinforce and perpetuate the notion that individuals who look “different” because of their
religion—particularly those belonging to minority faiths—may permissibly be relegated
to the “back rooms” or margins of American society. This article suggests that Title VII,
properly interpreted, does not permit such social separation.
II. TITLE VII AND WORKPLACE SEGREGATION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH CONSPICUOUS
RELIGIOUS ATTIRE
A.
The Applicable Legal Standards
1.
The Statutory Framework: Title VII
Title VII is the federal statute governing discrimination in the employment
context. 29 The statute prohibits certain conduct and imposes affirmative duties on
employers. The statute makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such
individual’s . . . religion,” 30 or “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual’s . . . religion.” 31 The term “religion” is quite
broad, and encompasses “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as
belief. . .” 32 Title VII affirmatively obligates an employer to “reasonably accommodate”
an individual’s religious observance and practice. 33 But an employer need not offer a
reasonable accommodation if doing so would impose an “undue hardship” on the
employer. 34
The Supreme Court has recognized two primary theories of liability under Title
VII: disparate treatment and disparate impact. A disparate treatment claim is based on the
proposition that the employer has “treat[ed] some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 35 Plaintiffs in disparate
treatment cases must prove that the defendant employer “had a discriminatory intent or
motive.” 36 By contrast, a disparate impact claim challenges “employment practices that
29

Title VII applies only to employers with at least fifteen employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006)
(“The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees. . . .”). Title VII does not apply to certain educational institutions that are affiliated with
religious institutions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2). Non-citizens employed abroad are also ineligible for Title
VII protection. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).
30
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
31
42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(2).
32
42 U.S.C. §2000e(j).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
36
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988). See also Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)

6

are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly
on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.” 37 To prove a
disparate impact claim, a plaintiff need not present “evidence of the employer’s
subjective intent to discriminate[, which] is required in a ‘disparate treatment’ case.”38
Workplace segregation cases are characterized by a conflict between the
appearance of the employee or applicant, which is dictated by his or her religious beliefs,
and the employer’s policies or corporate image standards, which are designed to make the
employer attractive or otherwise acceptable to the public. Examples of such corporate
policies include grooming requirements that prohibit beards or long hair. or rules banning
employees from wearing hats. An individual whose religious appearance violates an
employer’s policies often seeks, and is generally entitled to, an accommodation on
account of his or her religious beliefs. But these “religious accommodation” cases do not
conform to the disparate treatment and disparate impact categories described above. 39
They are subject to a distinct, judicially-created form of analysis.
2.

The Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case
Courts in religious accommodation cases first require a plaintiff to present a prima
facie case, which necessitates a showing that the plaintiff has: (1) a bona fide religious
belief that conflicts with the employer’s applicable policies or rules, (2) informed the
employer of this belief, and (3) suffered an adverse employment action for failing to
comply with the conflicting employer policy or rule. 40 An adverse employment action is
broadly interpreted as any “significant change in employment status, such as hiring,
firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a
decision causing a significant change in benefits.” 41 An employee does not need to show
37

Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.15. See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (stating
that Title VII “proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation”).
38
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 646 (1989). For further analysis of the distinction
between disparate impact and disparate treatment claims, see Martha Chamallas, The Market Excuse, 68 U.
CHI. L. REV. 579, 599–600 (2001) (“The major conceptual distinction between the two theories is that
disparate treatment requires proof of discriminatory intent or motivation, while disparate impact reaches
unintentional discrimination that stems from neutral policies or practices that have a disproportionate
adverse effect. . . .”).
39
See EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., 94 F.3d 314, 317 n.3 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Where the issue is the
incompatibility of a religious practice with a job requirement, religious discrimination claims do not fit
comfortably into the ordinary Title VII dichotomy between ‘disparate treatment’ and ‘disparate impact’
theories of liability.”).
40
Protos v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Turpen v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex.
R.R. Co., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984)).
41
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). Such an action “might be indicated by a
termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished
title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that
might be unique to a particular situation.” Id. (quoting Crady v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993
F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993). However, a “demotion without change in pay, benefits, duties, or prestige”
or a “reassignment to [a] more inconvenient job” does not constitute an adverse employment action. Id.
(citations omitted).
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he or she was subjected to an adverse employment action if the employee can prove that
he or she acceded to the employment policy under a reasonable fear of being subjected to
an adverse employment action. 42 As explained by the Ninth Circuit, “[A]lthough we have
occasionally used language implying that the employer must discharge the employee
because of the conflict, we have never in fact required that the employee’s penalty for
observing his or her faith be so drastic.” 43
Though the elements of a prima facie case are rarely litigated in religion-based
appearance discrimination cases, 44 some plaintiffs have failed to make a prima facie
showing. In Hussein v. Waldorf Astoria Hotel, for example, a Muslim catering employee
challenged the Waldorf-Astoria hotel’s “no-beards” policy. 45 The Second Circuit held,
however, that the employee, who one day came to work with a beard, lacked a bona fide
religious belief, and thus failed to establish a prima facie case. 46 According to the court,
the plaintiff “had never before, in his fourteen years of working at the Waldorf, worn a
beard” and “he did not attempt to explain why this was so.” 47 Further undercutting the
plaintiff’s case, he “shaved the beard off three months later.” 48 Therefore, “a reasonable
jury could not find that Hussein’s religious assertion was bona fide.” 49 In Ali v. Alamo
Rent-A-Car Inc., the Fourth Circuit decided that a Muslim employee failed to establish a
prima facie case because she did not prove an adverse employment action. 50 Alamo had
transferred the employee to a position with less customer contact because she wore a
headscarf. The plaintiff conceded that the transfer did not constitute an “adverse
employment action.” 51 Therefore, the court held the employee failed to make out a prima
facie case. 52
A separate case invites the view that the decision may have been different had the
plaintiff not conceded that she did not suffer an adverse employment action. In Brown v.
F.L. Roberts & Co., Inc., the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts explained that the determination of whether an employment action is
42

See EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 614 n.5 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The threat of
discharge (or of other adverse employment practices) is a sufficient penalty. An employee does not cease to
be discriminated against because he temporarily gives up his religious practice and submits to the
employment policy.”). See also Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, No. 95-CV-5371, 1996 WL 22964, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 1996) (“It is nonsensical to suggest that an employee who, when forced by his employer
to choose between his job and his faith, elects to avoid potential financial and/or professional damage by
acceding to his employer’s religiously objectionable demands has not been the victim of religious
discrimination.”).
43
See Townley, 859 F.2d at 614 n.5 (emphasis in original).
44
See Blair, supra note 20, at 539 (noting that employees generally survive the prima facie step without
difficulty and that it is the next step in which the heart of the legal dispute generally lies).
45
Hussein v. Waldorf Astoria Hotel, 31 Fed.Appx. 740, 741 (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 2002).
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
8 Fed. App’x 156, 157 (4th Cir. 2001).
51
Id.
52
Id. at 159.
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adverse is case-specific. 53 In assessing whether the responsibilities the plaintiff lost were
significant enough to constitute an adverse employment action, the court reasoned that “it
would be distasteful to suggest that employers can legally single out employees who
assert inconvenient but bonafide religious beliefs and isolate them in unappealing work
environments without ‘adversely’ affecting the conditions of their employment.” 54 At the
summary judgment stage, the court held that the employee’s transfer could constitute an
adverse employment action because a jury could find that “the responsibilities Plaintiff
lost [in the transfer] were ‘significant’” and not “merely ‘minor changes.’” 55 Despite this,
the court ultimately held that the plaintiff sought too much and that approving the
requested “blanket exemption from the grooming policy . . . would constitute an undue
hardship”; therefore, the court found for the defendant at the summary judgment phase. 56
3.

The “Reasonable Accommodation”and “Undue Hardship” Tests
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendantemployer 57 to show either that: (1) a reasonable accommodation was offered by the
plaintiff (that is, that the employer’s affirmative duty under Title VII was satisfied), or (2)
an undue hardship would result if a reasonable accommodation were made (that is, that
the statutory safe haven should shield the employer from liability). 58
In the religious discrimination context, the Supreme Court holds that a
“reasonable accommodation” is one that “eliminates the conflict between employment
requirements and religious practices.” 59 An acceptable “reasonable accommodation”
must be the by-product of a good faith back-and-forth between the employer and the
employee. 60 Speaking to this requirement, the United States District Court for the
53

419 F. Supp. 2d 7, 13 (D. Mass. 2006).
Id. at 13–14. See id. at 15 (ruling that plaintiff met prima facie case of discrimination where
“Defendant’s accommodation restricted Plaintiff to a cold, uncomfortable, isolated work site, with
significantly diminished responsibilities, as the price of maintaining his bonafide religious practice”).
55
Id. at 13.
56
Id. at 17.
57
The burden of persuasion rests with the plaintiff at all times; however, the defendant possesses the
burden of production in this shifting scheme. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659
(1989).
58
See Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 274 F.3d 470, 475 (7th Cir. 2001) (“A plaintiff alleging
religious discrimination under Title VII must first establish a prima facie case, after which the burden is on
the employer to show that a reasonable accommodation of the religious practice was made or that any
accommodation would result in undue hardship.”).See also Trans World Airlines Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S.
63, 74 (1997) (a reasonable accommodation is not required if it poses an “undue hardship”).
59
Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986). In this sense, the term “reasonable” may be
misleading, as an accommodation need only fulfill the objective of removing the conflict to be deemed
“reasonable.”
60
See Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 69 (stating that “bilateral cooperation is appropriate in the search for an
acceptable reconciliation of the needs of the employee’s religion and the exigencies of the employer’s
business”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Although I argue that relegating an employee to
the back is never a reasonable result of this back-and-forth negotiation, when an individual employee
requests to be placed in the back, I would not consider the accommodation to be unreasonable under Title
VII. See Lorenz v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. SA-05-CA-0319 OG (NN), 2006 WL 1562235, at *10 (W.D.
54
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Southern District of New York held in Hussein that an employer is not required to
accommodate an immediate, “on-the-spot” request by a religious employee who wants an
exception to an appearance policy. 61 The nature of Hussein’s last-minute request did not
present an opportunity for the employer and employee to engage in a collaborative
dialogue as to an appropriate accommodation. The United States District Court for the
District of Arizona rejected an employer’s proposed accommodation based, in part, on
the same requirement. The accommodation proposed by the employer—that an employee
remove a religious headscarf when working with clients—did not resolve the tension
because it was not developed from a good faith, bilateral process. 62
While an accommodation should result from employer-employee dialogue, an
employee is not entitled to a range of possible accommodations from which to select. 63
Nor is an employee entitled to an optimal accommodation or to the accommodation he or
she suggests or wants. As the Second Circuit notes, “to avoid Title VII liability, the
employer need not offer the accommodation the employee prefers. Instead, when any
reasonable accommodation is provided, the statutory inquiry ends.” 64
It is worth noting that this iterative process can yield satisfactory outcomes for
both the employer and the employee. For example, in EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp.,
through this process, the employer agreed to a religion-based exemption to its policy
requiring all employees engaged in customer contact to be clean-shaven. 65
Rather than offer an accommodation, an employer may contend that an
accommodation would result in an “undue hardship.” An “undue hardship” is any
economic or non-economic cost that imposes more than a de minimis encumbrance on the
employer. 66 For example, in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, the Supreme Court
held that an airline was not required to allow a religious employee to miss work on the
Sabbath because granting the employee’s schedule request would disrupt the seniority
system and finding other employees to take his place would result in “lost efficiency in
other jobs or higher wages.” 67 From Hardison, it is evident that an employer may show
Tex. May 24, 2006) (employee who wore a priest’s shirt and collar, and other religious attire, proposed that
Walmart “allow him to work his entire shift in the backroom of the store thereby removing him from the
customers’ view”).
61
See Hussein v. The Waldorf-Astoria, 134 F. Supp. 2d 591, 598–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
62
EEOC v. Alamo Rent-a-Car, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1013–14 (D. Ariz. 2006).
63
See Beadle v. Hillsborough Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 29 F.3d 589, 592 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[C]ompliance with
Title VII does not require an employer to give an employee a choice among several accommodations. . . .”).
64
Cosme v. Henderson, 287 F.3d 152, 158 (2nd Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). See also Philbrook, 479 U.S.
at 68 (“We find no basis in either the statute or its legislative history for requiring an employer to choose
any particular reasonable accommodation. By its very terms the statute directs that any reasonable
accommodation by the employer is sufficient to meet its accommodation obligation.”); Beadle, 29 F.3d at
592 (stating that “the inquiry ends when an employer shows that a reasonable accommodation was afforded
the employee, regardless of whether that accommodation is one which the employee suggested”).
65
EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., No. CV100-50 (S.D. Ga. May 24, 2001) (consent decree) (in case brought
by a Muslim employee, the employer agreed to a religion-based exemption to a policy requiring that
employees engaged in customer contact had to be clean-shaven).
66
See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (8th Cir. 1997) (“To require TWA to bear
more than a de minimis cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship.”).
67
Id.
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that it faces an undue hardship when a proposed accommodation imposes on other
employees as well as when it burdens the employer itself. 68
In the religious appearance context, courts have identified an undue hardship
under several circumstances. An undue hardship may be present when an employee
demands a wholesale exception from the employer’s appearance policies, and is
unwilling to find a compromise solution. 69 For example, in Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale
Corp., the plaintiff, a follower of the Church of Body Modification, refused to cover her
facial piercings with bandages, and insisted instead on an outright exemption to the nopiercings policy. 70 The First Circuit held that such exemption constituted an undue
hardship because piercings “detract from the ‘neat, clean and professional image’ that
[Costco] aims to cultivate.” 71 Similarly, in Daniels v. City of Arlington, the Fifth Circuit
held that the defendant employer faced an undue hardship when the plaintiff police
officer insisted on wearing a gold cross pin on his uniform, in violation of the police
department’s no-pins policy. According to the court, the police department faced an
undue hardship because “a police department cannot be forced to let individual officers
add religious symbols to their official uniforms.” 72
An undue hardship also may exist when a compromise is “simply impossible”:
“[f]or example, there is no middle ground between a company’s requirements that
employees be clean-shaven and the employees’ religious beliefs prohibiting shaving.” 73
Courts have also recognized an undue hardship where exemptions would affect the
employer’s public image. 74 Undue hardship is perhaps most clearly present where an
accommodation would endanger the health or safety of the employee, his or her coworkers, or the general public. 75 For example, in Kalsi v. New York City Transit
68

See Weber v. Roadway Express Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that the proposed
accommodation was “more than a de minimis expense because [it] unduly burden[ed] his co-workers, with
respect to compensation and ‘time-off’ concerns”).
69
See, e.g., Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 132 (1st Cir. 2004) (“We find dispositive
that the only accommodation Cloutier considers reasonable, a blanket exemption from the no-facial-jewelry
policy, would impose an undue hardship on Costco.”) Cf. Dodd v. SEPTA, No. 06-4213, 2008 WL
2902618, at *10 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 2008) (rejecting, on summary judgment, defendant’s argument that it
suffered an undue hardship when the plaintiff “merely requested to wear his hair in any style that would
allow him to keep it long, a minor deviation from the grooming policy that apparently was already
practiced by several other officers”).
70
Cloutier, 390 F.3d at 128–30.
71
Id. at 136.
72
Daniels v. City of Arlington, 246 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2001). By eschewing other options, such as
wearing the cross around his neck or wrist, the plaintiff also failed to “fulfill his duty of cooperation” under
the reasonable accommodation prong. Id.
73
United States v. New York City Transit Auth., No. 04-CV-4237, 2010 WL 3855191, at *21 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 28, 2010) (citing Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
74
See, e.g., Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 419 F. Supp. 2d 7, 16 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding that allowing the
plaintiff to keep his hair and beard long, in violation of Jiffy Lube’s grooming policy, would constitute “an
undue hardship because it would adversely affect the employer’s public image.”) (quoting Cloutier v.
Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 136 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1131 (2005)).
75
See, e.g., Bhatia v. Chevron 734 F.2d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding an undue hardship where Sikh
plainitff’s failure to shave his beard would expose him to toxic gas ). If “the proposed accommodation
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Authority, a Sikh employee sought an accommodation to the Transit Authority’s
requirement that all car inspectors wear a hard hat. The court, unsurprisingly, was
unsympathetic. The court concluded that Kalsi’s proposed request to not wear a hard hat
posed safety risks to himself as well as insurance costs to the authority that the employer
was not obligated under Title VII to shoulder.76
To be sure, under this category of undue hardship, courts have rejected employer
attempts to invoke the undue hardship safe harbor where a proposed accommodation
would not raise “safety concerns or other legitimate business concerns.” 77 In United
States v. New York City Transit Authority, for example, a group of Sikh employees
brought a religious appearance claim against the transit authority for failing to allow an
exemption from its policy requiring bus drivers to wear hats bearing the company’s
logo. 78 The court held that the employees’ proposed compromise—that they wear a
turban of a color that reflects the employer’s uniform and place the company logo on a
different part of their uniform other than the turban—would not “adversely affect the
TA’s business in any way.” 79 Courts have also been unreceptive to employers’ attempts
to demonstrate an undue hardship by claiming that a flood of similar requests for
accommodations will follow if the court grants the exception. “A mere assumption that
many more people, with the same religious practices as the person being accommodated,
may also need accommodation is not evidence of undue hardship.” 80
The bulk of litigation with respect to religious accommodation cases—of which
workplace segregation cases are a subset—lies in this second part of the burden-shifting
scheme: whether an employer has discharged its duty to offer a reasonable
accommodation or whether an undue hardship justifies the employer in refusing an
accommodation. 81 If an employer fulfills either prong and rebuts the employee’s prima
facie case, the burden then shifts back to “the plaintiff, who has the ultimate burden of
persuasion, [to] show that the employer’s proffered reasons for failure to accommodate
threatens to compromise safety in the workplace, the employer’s burden of establishing an undue burden is
light.” Kalsi v. New York City Transit Auth., 62 F. Supp. 2d 745, 758 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). However, at least
one court has questioned whether the employer possessed a legitimate health and safety justification for
refusing an accommodation, or whether the lack of an accommodation was a function of animus. See
Mohamed-Sheik, 2006 WL 709573, at *5 (finding evidence that “safety concerns may not have been the
exclusive, or even the primary factor behind the enforcement of the policy”).
76
Kalsi, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 758–60 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
77
U.S. v. New York City Transit Auth., 2010 WL 3855191, at *21.
78
Id.
79
Id. at *22.
80
29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(1) (2010). See also EEOC v. Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc., No. C041291JLR, 2005 WL 2090677, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 29, 2005) (“The court is unmoved by Red Robin’s
final, ‘slippery slope’ argument . . . . Determining whether an undue hardship exists depends on the facts of
each case, and ‘the mere possibility that there would be a unfulfillable number of additional requests for
similar accommodations by others cannot constitute undue hardship.”) (quoting Opuku-Boateng v.
California, 95 F.3d 1468, 1474 (9th Cir. 1996)).
81
Donna D. Page, Veganism and Sincerely Held “Religious” Beliefs in the Workplace: No Protection
Without Definition, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 363, 368 (2005) (stating that “when claims are brought on
religious discrimination grounds, most of the litigation is centered on the issues of what is a ‘reasonable
accommodation’ and what constitutes ‘undue hardship’”).
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are a pretext for discrimination.” 82 The plaintiff may establish pretext by demonstrating
“directly . . . that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or
indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence.” 83
4.

The “Bona Fide Occupational Qualification” Affirmative Defense
Title VII also provides employers with an affirmative defense to claims of
discrimination. Instead of proceeding down the “reasonable accommodation” or “undue
hardship” route, an employer may concede that it is discriminating on the basis of
religion, but argue that such discrimination is permissible because it is based on a “bona
fide occupational qualification [‘BFOQ’] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise.” 84 To properly invoke the BFOQ affirmative
defense, an employer must prove that virtually all members of the plaintiff’s class cannot
perform the position in question 85 or that the employer’s essential operations would be
compromised were it not for the discrimination. 86
An employer seeking to deny employment to a job applicant with conspicuous
religious attire may, in principle, invoke the BFOQ affirmative defense. The BFOQ
defense is “written narrowly” and the Supreme Court “has read it narrowly.” 87 Indeed, it
has been accepted only in several limited contexts. 88 For example, courts have
recognized the defense when discriminatory hiring is necessary to protect the privacy
interests of third parties, such as when a health care employer hires only female nurses to
treat female patients, or when a restaurant hires only male attendants to service a men’s
bathroom. 89 Courts have also recognized a valid BFOQ defense when the employment
82

Baz v. Walters, 782 F.2d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 1986).
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). For an example of the court finding
pretext, see Mohamed-Sheik v. Golden Foods/Golden Brands LLC, No. Civ.A. 303CV737H, 2006 WL
709573, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 16, 2006) (denying defendant’s summary judgment motion after finding
evidence that “safety concerns may not have been the exclusive, or even the primary factor behind the
enforcement of the policy”).
84
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006). This affirmative defense is not available in claims alleging
discrimination on the basis of race. See id.
85
See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (quoting Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d
228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969)).
86
See id. (quoting Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971))..
87
Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991).
88
See Ray v. Univ. of Ark., 868 F. Supp. 1104, 1126 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (“in certain limited circumstances,
courts are to recognize the bona fide occupational qualification (bfoq) defense”); see also U.S. EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Compliance Manual § 12II-D (2008) (Bona Fide Occupational
Qualification), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religion.html (“It is well settled that for employers that are
not religious organizations and therefore seek to rely on the BFOQ defense to justify a religious preference,
the defense is a narrow one and can rarely be successfully invoked.”).
89
See Int’l Union, 499 U.S. at 206 n.4 (suggesting that the BFOQ defense could be available “when privacy
interests are implicated”); Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1423 (N.D. Ill. 1984)
(holding that using only female attendants in female restrooms is permissible when “a customer’s
fundamental privacy rights are implicated”); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1354
(D. Del. 1978) (holding that “employment of a male nurse’s aide would directly undermine the essence of
83
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decision was purportedly made for safety reasons, such as when a prison hires only male
guards to oversee the male section of a prison. 90 With respect to gender discrimination,
employers may engage in discriminatory employment practices when “authenticity” or
“genuineness” is at stake, such as when a theatre company refuses to hire a man to play a
female role in a play. 91 In each of these circumstances, courts tolerated discrimination
because it was based on a qualification that affected an “individual’s ability to perform
the assigned tasks.” 92
B. Representative Cases of Workplace Segregation
1.
Workplace Segregation and Sikhs
Multiple courts have found in favor of employers in religious accommodation
cases brought by individuals alleging discrimination on the basis of their appearance.
That said, two cases best exemplify courts’ willingness to interpret Title VII to allow
workplace segregation in the religious context. The courts in these cases address both
aspects of the second, more contentious prong of the burden-shifting paradigm: whether
the employer fulfilled its duty to offer a reasonable accommodation and whether the
employer is relieved from having to offer a reasonable accommodation because doing so
would impose an undue hardship. These cases also involve the two types of segregation
referenced herein: segregation within the workplace (i.e., placing the employee out of
public view once hired) and from the workplace (i.e., not hiring the candidate at all).
Because both cases involve plaintiffs who belong to the Sikh religion, it is
relevant to first consider the inherent features of the Sikh religion that expose its
followers to workplace segregation. Male Sikhs are required by their faith to wear a
turban and to refrain from cutting their hair. 93 These requirements give Sikhs a distinct,
non-traditional physical identity that directly conflicts with common employer policies,
such as those that mandate employees be clean-shaven or that prohibit headgear of any
sort in the workplace. When working for an employer with such policies, Sikhs are often
forced to choose between complying with their faith and abiding by their employer’s
policies. A Sikh employee who decides to comply with the strictures of the Sikh religion
may be relegated to a position outside of public view or be denied the job opportunity
from the outset.
It is next helpful to consider the practical realities of the Sikh experience in the
United States. Sikhs are more likely to face discrimination, including workplace
discrimination, because they are a relatively little-known religious community often
[defendant’s] business operation” because female clients objected to seeing male nurses, and defendant was
too small to hire enough aides so that at least one female nurse was on each shift).
90
Int’l Union, 499 U.S. at 202 (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977)).
91
See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (2010).
92
Int’l Union, 499 U.S. at 203.
93

See Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 884 (9th Cir. 1995) (enumerating the Sikh articles of faith);
Neha Singh Gohil & Dawinder S. Sidhu, The Sikh Turban: Post-9/11 Challenges to this Article of Faith, 9
RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 10, 12 (2008) (explaining that Sikhs are required to wear five articles of faith,
including unshorn hair, and that although the turban is not one of the five articles, it has been codified as
part of a Sikh’s required dress).
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mistaken for Muslims. 94 While Sikhism is the fifth largest religion in the world, with
over 20 million adherents, 95 few are aware that Sikhism is a separate faith and as a
consequence many Americans assume for purely optic reasons that Sikhs are members of
the Muslim faith. 96 Due to this visual similarity and the highly charged atmosphere in the
wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, Sikhs have faced overwhelming
discrimination in the past ten years.97
Because of this general public ignorance and because Sikhs remain a disfavored
group, employers appear poised to cater to customer biases by placing Sikhs away from
public view or by failing to hire Sikhs in the first instance. An example may help animate
and give meaning to these observations.
Kevin Harrington is a Sikh train operator for the Metropolitan Transit Authority
(MTA) in New York City. After 9/11, imagining that the public would not want to see a
turbaned man at the helm of a commuter train in Manhattan, the MTA told Harrington
that he could not wear his turban as a train operator. The MTA informed him that, if he
wanted to wear his turban, he had to stop working as a rail conductor and accept a
position in the rail yard, away from customers. 98 Harrington agreed to take the yard
position because he was afraid that if he did not, he would lose his job altogether. 99
Harrington said the MTA’s decision made him feel like “some sort of unique individual .
. . who the public doesn’t want to see because I inspire fear in them as though I’m some
sort of terrorist.” 100 His experience demonstrates that segregation of Sikh employees is
not a mere theoretical possibility—turbaned Sikhs are segregated in the employment
context due to the actual or invented customer aversion to Sikhs’ religious identity.
As Harrington’s legal case against the MTA is pending resolution and thus does
not supply us with judicial conclusions that may be reviewed and evaluated, I turn to two
other cases in which the federal courts considered whether an employer could segregate
94

See Hon. Mary Murphy Schroeder, Guarding Against the Bigotry that Fuels Terrorism, 48-DEC Fed.
Law. 26 (Nov./Dec. 2001) (commenting on the “blatant ignorance” of Sikhs that permitted a Sikh to be
murdered in a post-9/11 hate incident); see generally Dawinder S. Sidhu, A Decade After 9/11, Ignorance
Persists, ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 16, 2011 (against the backdrop of an unprovoked attack on a man
perceived to be Muslim, suggesting that Muslims and those perceived to be Muslim “are not free from the
ignorance and hatred that enable such senseless acts to take place.”).
95
See Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 326 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1130 n.1 (E.D.Cal.
2003) .
96
See Gohil & Sidhu, supra note [xxx] at 3 n.10.
97
See Bilal Zaheer, Accommodating Minority Religions Under Title VII: How Muslims Make the Case for a
New Interpretation of Section 701(j), 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 500 (2007). In March 2011, two turbaned
Sikh men were shot in Elk Grove, California. The local police chief indicated that the men could have been
confused for Muslims and thus targeted because of their appearance. See Robert Lewis, Attack on Two Sikh
Men Seen as Possible Hate Crime, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 6, 2011,
http://www.sacbee.com/2011/03/06/3453199/attack-on-two-sikh-men-seen-as.html. Attacks against Sikh
individuals highlight how customers—and, therefore, employers—may discriminate against Sikhs in the
workplace.
98
See DAWINDER S. SIDHU, PLURALISM PROJECT, CASE STUDY 4: BRANDING A HERO (2010).
99
See id.
100
Robert Smith, Sikhs Object to MTA Logo Requirement, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (July 16, 2005),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4757415.
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Sikh employees on the basis of their religious appearance. In both of these cases, the
courts upheld the segregation of the Sikhs under Title VII.
2.

Birdi v. United Airlines Corporation
In Birdi v. United Airlines Corporation, 101 the plaintiff, Sukhpreet S. Birdi, a
turbaned Sikh, worked as a ticketing agent for United Airlines. United instituted a
uniform policy that required employees to remove “all headgear . . . when indoors.” 102
Birdi’s turban violated this policy. In an effort to resolve the conflict, United offered to
allow Birdi to wear his turban as long as he accepted one of six alternative positions. At
least four of the six positions placed Birdi away from public view, and the remaining two
were unfeasible because of Birdi’s schedule. The alternative positions were “radically
different from the [customer service representative] job” that he held, and some paid
significantly less. Believing that these options were inadequate to reasonably
accommodate his religious beliefs, Birdi sued United Airlines under Title VII. 103
In federal district court, Birdi presented his prima facie case. United then argued
that it offered a reasonable accommodation because the six alternative positions would
eliminate the conflict between its uniform policy and Birdi’s religious requirements. 104
Birdi argued in response that these positions were insufficient because none involved
customer contact. He had been a ticketing agent, and he wanted to maintain a position
that had some customer interaction. Indeed, he “sought the [customer service
representative] position specifically for [the face-to-face customer contact] aspect and
hope[d] to cultivate a career involving this type of customer relations.” 105
The court rejected Birdi’s argument, stating that a plaintiff is not entitled to his
preferred accommodation. 106 Rather, the court held, United was obligated only to provide
any reasonable accommodation that would remove the conflict between the uniform
policy and the employee’s religiously-mandated appearance. 107 At least five of the six
alternative positions presented by United were satisfactory under this standard. 108
According to the court, “Title VII does not require United to accommodate Birdi’s need
for face-to-face customer contact, and even if a conflict of schedule would render an
accommodation unreasonable, United attempted to alleviate this problem by offering
more positions.” 109
101

No. 99 C 5576, 2002 WL 471999 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2002).
Id. at *1.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
See id.
106
See id. (“Title VII does not require the employer to provide the accommodation that the employee
desires; any reasonable accommodation is sufficient.”) (citing EEOC v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., No. 95 C
5610, 1997 WL 399635 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 1997)).
107
Id. at *2 (accepting at least five of the proposed accommodations as reasonable because they “offered
the same benefits package and opportunity for advancement as was available to CSRs”).
108
See id. (stating that “even if the ‘dead end’ position was unreasonable, at least one of the remaining five
was reasonable”).
109
Id.
102
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Birdi reflects the modest nature of the “reasonable accommodation” requirement
under Title VII. More importantly for our purposes, the decision demonstrates courts’
willingness to find a proposed accommodation involving segregation acceptable under
Title VII.
3.

EEOC v. Sambo’s of Georgia, Inc.
In EEOC v. Sambo’s of Georgia, Inc., 110 the plaintiff, Mohan Singh Tucker, had
applied for a managerial position with Sambo’s Restaurants. 111 Tucker, an observant
Sikh, wore a turban and had a beard. 112 Sambo’s, however, had a longstanding grooming
policy that was applicable at all of its 1,100 restaurants. The policy required all
employees to be clean-shaven (although “neatly trimmed mustaches” were allowed),
prevented employees from wearing headgear, and did not include any exception for
employees based on their religious beliefs. 113 Sambo’s rejected Tucker’s employment
application solely because he did not conform to the company’s grooming policy. 114 The
EEOC filed suit on Tucker’s behalf under Title VII. 115
In its decision, the court noted that “the wearing of a beard . . . or headwear does
not comply with the public image that Sambo’s has built up over the years.” It found that
similar grooming policies “are common in the restaurant industry,” and that exceptions
“would have an adverse effect on the Sambo’s system as a whole . . . [which is why]
Sambo’s has never knowingly permitted any exceptions.” The court noted that Sambo’s’
facially neutral grooming policy is “based on management’s perception and experience
that a significant segment of the consuming public (in the market aimed at and served by
Sambo’s) prefer restaurants whose managers and employees are clean-shaven. According
to the court, “adverse customer reaction in this market to beards arises from a simple
aversion to, or discomfort in dealing with, bearded people; from a concern that beards are
unsanitary or conducive to unsanitary conditions; or . . . from a concern that a restaurant
operated by a bearded manager might be lax in maintaining its standards as to cleanliness
and hygiene in other regards.” Therefore “the requirement of clean-shavenness . . . is
essential to attracting and holding customers in that market.” 116
As Sambo’s did not offer a reasonable accommodation to Tucker and dismissed
his employment application outright, Sambo’s defended its actions under Title VII’s
undue hardship safe harbor and the BFOQ affirmative defense. 117 The court agreed with
Sambo’s that an undue hardship precluded the statutory obligation to provide an
accommodation: according to the court, any “relaxation” of Sambo’s grooming policy
“would impose an undue hardship on Sambo’s in that doing so would adversely affect
Sambo’s public image and the operation of the affected restaurant or restaurants as a
110

530 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
Id. at 88.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 88–89.
114
Id. at 89.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 91.
111
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consequence of offending certain customers and diminishing the ‘clean cut’ image of the
restaurant and its personnel.” The court also held that exemptions from the grooming
policy would impose “a risk of noncompliance with sanitation regulations,” and make it
more difficult to enforce the grooming standards on other personnel.118 The court
concluded that these costs are “certainly more” than the de minimis threshold needed for
an undue hardship to exist. 119
The EEOC argued that a defendant employer could not use customer preference
to support a finding of an undue hardship. According to the EEOC, Sambo’s “attempt to
justify [its] policy on the basis of customer preference . . . is an insufficient justification
or defense as a matter of law.” 120 The court was not convinced, holding that the
“appearance of cleanliness in the retail food industry makes employee grooming
standards that forbid facial hair a business necessity.” 121
The court did not rest there. Though the court relieved Sambo’s from the
requirement of providing an accommodation on undue hardship grounds, it went on to
rule in favor of Sambo’s on the BFOQ affirmative defense as well. According to the
court, “clean-shavenness is a bona fide occupational qualification for a manager of a
restaurant, such as those operated by Sambo’s, that relies upon and appeals to the family
trade.” 122
The Sambo’s court’s decision shows an acute awareness of and sensitivity to
employers’ interests in placating customer preferences and maintaining their public
image. It reflects the courts’ understanding that a failure to cater to customer preferences
can have a detrimental effect on employers’ businesses.
III. PROPERLY INTERPRETED, TITLE VII DOES NOT PERMIT WORKPLACE SEGREGATION ON
THE BASIS OF RELIGION
In the remainder of this Article, I critically examine the arguments invoked by
courts and commentators to justify the proposition that Title VII does not forbid
workplace segregation of individuals with religiously-mandated appearances. I argue that
the text and purpose of Title VII do not permit religion-based segregation as defined
herein. This argument includes two subparts. First, an alternative position that places a
religious employee outside of public view does not constitute a “reasonable
accommodation” under Title VII. In other words, employers may not eliminate a conflict
between an employees’ religious identity and the employers’ policies by segregating
those employees whose appearance is dictated by their religious beliefs. Second, an
employer may not use actual or perceived customer preferences as a basis for claiming it
would face an “undue hardship” if it accommodated an individual with a religiouslymandated appearance. Relatedly, an employer may not rely on its corporate brand, which
118

Id. at 90.
Id. at 91.
120
Id. at 91.
121
Id.
122
Id. The purported effect that the customer perception of facial hair may have on sanitation appeared to
offer additional support for the court’s ruling in favor of Sambo’s. See id. at 89–90. That aspect of the
court’s ruling is not challenged herein. See supra note [xxx].
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simply codifies and reflects customer preferences, to support an “undue hardship”
claim. 123
As the court’s interpretation of the law currently stands, employers’ statutory
responsibilities under Title VII with respect to religious individuals are minimal. Though
an employer has an affirmative obligation to provide a “reasonable accommodation,” the
employer is required to do nothing more than provide an accommodation that eliminates
the tension between the employer’s policies and the employee’s religious requirements.
This is a very limited duty. 124 Further, an employer need not bother to offer a reasonable
accommodation where doing so would impose an “undue hardship” on an employer. The
Third Circuit has described “the undue hardship test” as “not a difficult threshold to
pass.” 125 Under current precedent, therefore, employers who alter an individual’s work
conditions due to his or her religiously-mandated appearance are protected from liability
by fulfilling the undemanding “reasonable accommodation” requirement—which
seemingly approves of segregation—or by invoking the easily-triggered “undue
hardship” statutory sanctuary, which may be based on argument or evidence that
consumers prefer receiving service from majoritarian employees. These standards have
not been appropriately analyzed by the courts, and offer non-existent protection for
individuals with religiously-mandated appearances.
A. The Text and Purpose of Title VII Support a Ban on Workplace Segregation of
Individuals with Conspicuous Articles of Faith
It is inappropriate for courts to read the “reasonable accommodation” language in
Title VII in isolation. When an employee is discriminated against at work because of his
or her religiously-mandated appearance, the court should evaluate the “reasonable
accommodation” proposed by the employer in light of the the general anti-discrimination
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provision of Title VII. 126 This provision expressly makes it unlawful for an employer to
“segregate . . . his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s . . . religion.” 127
This provision clarifies and restricts what may constitute a “reasonable
accommodation” or “undue hardship.” The universe of what may be judicially recognized
as a “reasonable accommodation” or “undue hardship” shrinks when this provision is
added to the Title VII analysis. Accordingly, when an employer removes an employee to
a position outside of public view because of his or her religious appearance, the employer
is violating Title VII’s prohibition against segregation if the alternative position limits an
employee’s opportunities or otherwise adversely affect the employee’s status.
To place an religious individual outside of public view is to define the social
space that he or she may occupy. Segregated positions isolate a person, they limit that
person’s ability to interact with co-workers, customers, and the public at large, and they
validate public or employer bias as to who is worthy to represent a company. Such
positions deny cognizable opportunities and thus violate Title VII’s general antidiscrimination provision. In other words, positions outside of public view are de facto
unacceptable accommodations under the law. 128
For similar reasons, an employer who refuses to hire an individual on the basis of
his or her religious appearance is engaging in a form of segregation within the meaning
of Title VII. Compared to the situation just described—in which an individual is
employed, but hidden and confined to the back—an individual who is blocked from
employment because of his or her religious appearance arguably has a stronger claim of
segregation under Title VII. Indeed, a candidate who is denied a position remains outside
of the workforce and is further isolated and marginalized from the social spaces that are
inherent in employment. At least an employee who is relegated to the back areas is part
of the employer; he or she is in the office or workplace, albeit in the shadows. An
individual whose application is rejected, however, is completely severed from the
employer, potential co-workers, and the public.
The practical consequences of segregation are important to consider. Unless the
supplemental statutory limitation found in the general anti-discrimination provision is
given effect, companies are allowed to place the Muslim with a hijab, the turbaned Sikh,
and the Rastafarian with long-hair out of public sight, while those with majoritarian
appearances represent the employer with customers in the front of the business. These
appearance policies discriminate directly against the workers or job applicants and
perpetuate the very stereotypes and fear that underlie the segregation of individuals with
religiously-mandated appearances. If bearded Sikhs are never allowed to interact with
customers, then customers will never overcome their “aversion to, or discomfort in
dealing with, bearded people.” 129 Courts should not read Title VII in a manner that
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strengthens discriminatory animus, nor should courts, as an institutional matter, enable
this insidious spiral of discrimination to continue.
Although the legislative history of the Title VII provision that covers religious
discrimination is quite limited, 130 there is reason to believe Congress did not intend to
allow employers to segregate minority employees. Senator Jennings Randolph, a major
proponent of the religious accommodation provision, expressed “deep concern over
employees being forced to choose between religion and their jobs.” He instead “hoped to
eliminate that difficult choice for employees by requiring employers to make reasonable
accommodations for the religious needs of employees.” 131
As currently interpreted, however, Title VII does virtually nothing to eliminate
this choice. An individual must either alter his or her appearance in violation of his or her
religious beliefs or accept a position that restricts his or her employment opportunities,
prevents him or her from interacting with customers, and effectively relegates him or her
to second-tier status both in the specific sphere of employment and in the public more
generally. There is no valid, fair choice in this scenario. The options are, at bottom, “to
choose between a job and a deeply held religious practice.” 132 Interpreting the
“reasonable accommodation” standard in light of Title VII’s general anti-discrimination
provision will advance the purpose of Title VII by forcing employers to provide religious
employees with an accommodation that prevents this unfair choice
The findings of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) 133
offer additional support for reinterpreting the statute to reject a “reasonable
accommodation” that involves segregation. The EEOC reacted to the rising number of
cases of post-9/11 employment discrimination against Sikh employees by releasing
informal guidance on how to interpret Title VII in light of the special issues raised by
appearance-based religious discrimination. The guidance indicated that giving effect to
public discomfort of religious minorities by segregating employees is impermissible
under Title VII. The guidance contained the following example:
“Susan is an experienced clerical worker who wears a hijab (head scarf) in
conformance with her Muslim beliefs. XYZ Temps places Susan in a
long-term assignment with one of its clients. The client contacts XYZ and
requests that it notify Susan that she must remove her hijab while working
at the front desk, or that XYZ assign another person to Susan’s position.
According to the client, Susan’s religious attire violates its dress code and
presents the “wrong image.” Should XYZ comply with its client’s
request?
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“XYZ Temps may not comply with this client request without violating
Title VII. The client would also violate Title VII if it made Susan remove
her hijab or changed her duties to keep her out of public view.” 134
This opinion is consistent with the argument contained in this article. The guidance
possesses rather limited legal effect—according to the Supreme Court, such agency
materials are “[e]ntitled to respect,” only if they have the “power to persuade.” 135 The
EEOC’s interpretation nonetheless buttresses the argument that such employer conduct
violates Title VII.
Within this context, if we reconsider the Birdi case, it is clear that the plaintiff’s
litigation strategy was a losing one. Birdi contended that no accommodation offered by
United would be reasonable unless it involved customer contact. 136 Framed in this light,
the court ruled that a plaintiff in a religious accommodation case has no statutory right to
the accommodation that she wants; the plaintiff’s right, the court held, is tied to only that
which will eliminate the employer-employee conflict. 137
Under a proper reading of Title VII, however, Birdi could argue that the
alternatives offered by United would have effectively segregated him from the public and
placed him out of sight solely because of his religious appearance. In other words, he
would argue that no accommodation is reasonable if it involves segregation that
“deprive[s] . . . [him] of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect[s] his
status as an employee.” 138 Birdi’s status was adversely affected. Unlike employees
without conspicuous religious attire, he could not work in public areas or interact with
other co-workers and customers. Framed in this way, a court properly interpreting Title
VII would hold the options presented by United inadequate, not because they are
inconsistent with Birdi’s preferences, but because of the segregation that would have
resulted.
B. Customer Preference May Not Legitimate Otherwise D iscriminatory Employment
Actions
When examining whether to uphold an employer’s appearance policy in light of
an employee’s incompatible religious appearance, courts, including the Sambo’s court,
134
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have placed significant weight on evidence of customer reaction to the policy. 139 For
instance, in Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., the D.C. Circuit noted: “Perhaps no facet
of business life is more important than a company’s place in public estimation. That the
image created by its employees dealing with the public . . . affects its relations is so well
known that we may take judicial notice of an employer’s proper desire to achieve
favorable acceptance.” 140
It is no surprise that courts have upheld employer appearance standards under
Title VII given their recognition of the relationship between employee appearance,
customer reaction, and a company’s success. The Fagan court found that an employer’s
grooming policies operate “in our highly competitive business environment” and that
“[r]easonable requirements in furtherance of that policy are [therefore] an aspect of
managerial responsibility.” 141 Accordingly, as the First Circuit cautioned, if an employer
were to make an exemption for a religious employee, the employer would “forfeit[] its
ability to mandate compliance and thus [it] loses control over its public image. That loss .
. . would constitute an undue hardship.” 142
These courts have assumed that there is a sufficient nexus between employers’
appearance policies generally and the preferences of their customer base. Other courts,
however, have required a defendant employer to show that its specific appearance policy
garners a positive reception from the public or that granting an exception to that policy
will lead to a loss of business. 143 For example, in EEOC v. Red Robin Gourmet Burgers,
Inc., the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington rejected a
restaurant’s motion for summary judgment in a Title VII claim brought by an employee
with tattoos acquired for religious reasons. 144 According to the court, while the employer
may have wanted to maintain a “family-oriented and kid-friendly image,” the employer
“fail[ed] to present any evidence that visible tattoos are inconsistent with these goals
generally, or that its customers specifically share this perception. Hypothetical hardships
based on unproven assumptions typically fail to constitute undue hardship.” 145
I argue that it is irrelevant to the “undue hardship” analysis that an employer can
prove its customers prefer employees who abide by the employers’ appearance policies.
To the extent that employers have evidence that the public likes and expects employees to
conform to a particular “look,” the public’s preferences may, at worst, be infected with
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animus and, at best, perpetuate and reinforce homogenous conceptions as to who should
serve and interact with the public. Unfortunately, “people . . . are most comfortable
interacting with those who are visibly similar to themselves.” 146 It is axiomatic that
people tend to have more contact with individuals who have shared characteristics, such
as race and religion; 147 that people tend to “hold high opinions of groups to which they
belong and low opinions of those to which they do not;” 148 and that people tend to trust
“those who are most like . . . [us] physically and culturally,” rather than those who “look
different and follow different practices.” 149 In fact, sociological evidence indicates that
the preference to be around and to interact with those who look similar leads individuals
to segregate themselves according to shared physical attributes, and necessarily exclude
individuals not possessing certain traits. 150 This evidence supports the notion that
employers are “motivated to pursue homogeneity,” not just externally with the public,
but also internally based on the perception that “homogeneous workplaces facilitate trust,
loyalty, and cooperative behavior.” 151
Although most courts have ignored the reality of what customer preferences
actually reflect, at least one court has recognized that a lenient interpretation of Title VII
only perpetuates discriminatory views. The United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts in Brown, bound by precedent, approved an employer’s appearance
policy, but noted in dicta that “an excessive protection of an employer’s ‘image’
predilection encourages an unfortunately (and unrealistically) homogeneous view of our
richly varied nation.” 152
Yet again, the EEOC offers support for reinterpreting the statute to ignore
customer preferences in the “undue hardship” analysis. In two separate documents—the
EEOC Title VII guidance and the EEOC current compliance manual on religious
discrimination—the EEOC sets forth examples of employer behavior that violates Title
VII for taking customer preference into account in the specific context of employees or
applicants with conspicuous religious attire. The Title VII guidance presents the
following example:
146
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Narinder, a South Asian man who wears a Sikh turban, applies for a
position as a cashier at XYZ Discount Goods. XYZ fears Narinder’s
religious attire will make customers uncomfortable.
What should XYZ do?
XYZ should not deny Narinder the job due to notions of customer
preferences about religious attire. That would be unlawful. It would be the
same as refusing to hire Narinder because he is a Sikh. 153
The EEOC’s current compliance manual on religious discrimination provides a similarly
powerful example:
Nasreen, a Muslim ticket agent for a commercial airline, wears a head
scarf, or hijab, to work at the airport ticket counter. After September 11,
2001, her manager objected, telling Nasreen that the customers might
think she was sympathetic to terrorist hijackers. Nasreen explains to her
manager that wearing the hijab is her religious practice and continues to
wear it. She is terminated for wearing it over her manager’s objection.
Customer fears or prejudices do not amount to undue hardship, and the
refusal to accommodate her and the termination, therefore, violate Title
VII. In addition, denying Nasreen the position due to perceptions of
customer preferences about religious attire would be disparate treatment
based on religion in violation of Title VII, because it would be the same as
refusing to hire Nasreen because she is a Muslim. 154
The EEOC explicitly states that “notions about customer preference real or
perceived do not establish undue hardship.”155 By allowing employers to follow customer
preference, “white, male norms” are approved for public presentation and
consumption. 156 Unfamiliar religious appearances, particularly those belonging to
minority faiths, are marginalized, either because the employer is uncomfortable with
appearances outside the mainstream or because the employer believes it is respecting the
public’s wishes. 157 As a consequence, minority employees with visible representations of
their faiths are compelled to either hide their differences in order to conform to
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majoritarian, accepted appearances, 158 or maintain their distinct appearance at the risk of
losing employment opportunities. 159
When an employer endorses or validates the public’s discriminatory attitudes,
whether hidden or overt, it gives effect to those attitudes—whether or not the employer
held those same views. As Judge Richard Posner writes:
“A person who serves as a conduit for another person’s discrimination can
. . . be guilty of intentional discrimination . . . . Suppose a merchant
refuses to hire black workers not because he is racist but because he
believes that his customers do not like blacks and will take their business
elsewhere if he hires any. The refusal is nevertheless discrimination,
because it is treating people differently on account of their race. It is
intentional discrimination, because it necessarily is based on the
merchant’s awareness of racial difference and his decision to base
employment decisions on that awareness. And it is actionable
discrimination . . . notwithstanding the merchant’s own freedom from
racial animus.” 160
There is no reason to ignore Judge Posner’s words even though they were made in the
context of racial discrimination as opposed to religious appearance discrimination. Under
this “conduit” theory, an employer may not insulate itself from claims of discrimination
under Title VII by invoking the discriminatory views of its customer base, even when
there is evidence of customer preferences. 161
Where employees with conspicuous religious appearances are confined to certain
spaces, they lose the chance to interact with other colleagues and customers; they are
forced to perform different tasks in a position outside of view, and in the most extreme
158
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cases, they are eliminated from the candidate pool entirely. These deficiencies render an
accommodation that involves segregation inherently impermissible under Title VII no
matter how persuasively an employer may claim its customers prefer individuals not
bearing a conspicuous religious appearance. It is time to square this social and physical
isolation, and its attendant stigmatization, 162 with Title VII’s command to ensure that the
religious rights of the individual are sufficiently protected. 163
C. Other Contexts Support a Prohibition Against Segregation Premised on Religious
Appearance
Unfortunately, it is not a new phenomenon for employers to segregate or refuse to
hire optically different individuals whom they believe will put off their customers. Many
employers had tried to exclude African-Americans and women from jobs at their
workplaces, but the courts stepped in to prohibit workplace segregation on the basis of
race and gender. The courts’ rejection of this employer behavior in other civil rights
contexts is instructive and supports the doctrinal position that Title VII does not permit
employers to hide—inside the workplace or from the workforce—religious employees
with conspicuous articles of faith.
Congress responded to widespread racial discrimination in employment by
enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 164 The courts interpreted this legislation broadly to
prevent discrimination based on consumer preference. As Professor Deborah Rhode
notes, “Southern employers often argued that hiring blacks would be financially ruinous;
white customers would go elsewhere. In rejecting such customer preference defenses,
Congress and the courts recognized that the most effective way of combating prejudice
was to deprive people of the option to indulge it.” 165 The Court explained in 1964, that
“the fact that a ‘member of the class which is regulated may suffer economic losses not
shared by others . . . has never been a barrier’ to [upholding the Civil Rights Act].’” 166
These principles from the civil rights era on the use of customer preferences and
the risk of financial loss parallel and apply to the religious context as well. It is difficult
162
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to square the Court’s view on the role of customer preference based on race with the role
of customer preference based on religious appearance. 167
Courts have rejected similar employer arguments when used to justify requiring
female employees to look or act a certain way because of customer expectations related
to gender. 168 In Diaz v. Pan Am, the Fifth Circuit, for example, refused to find a BFOQ
simply because “Pan Am’s passengers prefer female stewardesses.” According to the
court, “it would be totally anomalous if we were to allow the preferences and prejudices
of the customers to determine whether the sex discrimination was valid. Indeed, it was, to
a large extent, these very prejudices the Act was meant to overcome.” 169
In perhaps the most comparable instance of customer preference influencing
allegedly discriminatory employer behavior, a group of women, Latinos, AsianAmericans, and African-Americans brought a class action suit challenging the
employment practices of Abercrombie & Fitch. 170 The plaintiffs, applicants to and
employees of the popular American clothier, charged that they were either not hired or
“were steered not to sales positions out front, but to low-visibility, back-of-the-store jobs,
stocking and cleaning up” 171 because they did not conform to Abercrombie’s corporate
image, specifically a “classic American,” or White look. 172 The parties settled, with
Abercrombie agreeing to pay the plaintiffs approximately $40 million and to engage in
more diverse employment activities, among other things.173
It is incongruous to recognize the impermissibility of converting customer
predispositions into a valid basis for employer decisionmaking when it is “because of”
race, gender, and ethnicity, but not when it is “because of” religion or religious
167
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appearance—even though all four categories are protected by Title VII. Reading Title VII
to prohibit such employer action, when it implicates distinct appearance caused by race,
gender, ethnicity, or religion, would give full effect to Title VII’s broad mandate and
resolve an imbalance which, at present, renders Title VII a limited safeguard for
employees with conspicuous religious appearances when compared to other protected
groups.
To be sure, one may argue that religion is unlike these other contexts for two
distinct reasons. First, racial and gender-specific appearances are said to be immutable,
whereas an individual’s religious appearance is technically alterable. To this, I point to
Sikhism as an example of why this potential objection is unpersuasive. A Sikh’s turban
and unshorn hair are not an option, but rather an integral, mandatory part of Sikh identity.
Indeed, a major Sikh civil rights organization explains that, “When a Sikh man or woman
dons a turban, the turban ceases to be just a piece of cloth and becomes one and the same
with the Sikh's head.” 174 In other words, for a Sikh, the turban and his or her physical
body become inseparable. In this respect, overt religious identity is an inextricable part
of the self, and is akin to race or gender.
Second, one may contend that customer preference for a particular racial or
gender-specific appearance directly reflects customers’ discriminatory animus against a
particular race or gender. But, one may continue, customer preferences in the religion
context are qualitatively different in that they may be neutral. Customers may find a
person with a clean-cut look more appealing—for example, because he looks cleaner—
regardless of whether that person maintains a beard for religious or non-religious reasons.
To this, I respond that Title VII does not require a customer to know that the beard has
religious significance – as long as the employer makes a decision based on an actual or
perceived preference that is part of an employee or applicant’s religious practices, the
employer is making a decision “because of” religion and thus falls within the bounds of
Title VII. As the two EEOC documents noted above place beyond dispute, such a
decision is the functional equivalent of rejecting an accommodation to an employee or
denying a position to an applicant because of religion, Judge Posner’s “conduit” theory
supports this argument, Specifically, in adopting or validating the preferences of its
customers, the employer becomes responsible for those preferences. Moreover, in a prima
facie case, the plaintiff need only prove that he or she informed the employer of the
conflict between her religious beliefs and the employment policy as well as explain the
religious need for the accommodation. At that point, the employer is on notice of the
religious nature of the employee or applicant’s appearance and becomes responsible for
the underlying preferences of the public, even if the public is itself unaware of the
religious character of a beard, headdress, or similar element of visual identity.
D. Sufficient Solutions Are Needed to Ensure Title VII is Read to Ban Religion-Based
Workplace Segregation
Employers will only be prohibited from discriminating against employees with
conspicuous religious appearances if courts engage in a more integrated reading of the
174
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text and purpose of Title VII, consider the harms of giving effect to discriminatory
customer preferences, and remember the lessons learned from other contexts. Rather than
wait for the courts, Congress should take action to clarify Title VII and restore its full
meaning as it relates to discrimination based on religion.
The Workplace Religious Freedom Act (WRFA) offers an opportunity for Congress
to strengthen Title VII in principled ways. 175 According to the Act, its purpose is “to
address the history and widespread pattern of discrimination by private sector employers
and Federal, State, and local government employers in unreasonably denying religious
accommodations in employment, specifically in the areas of garb, grooming, and
scheduling.” 176 Senator Kerry, the sponsor of the bill, rose to declare that Congress
should change Title VII to clarify that it does not tolerate an employee being forced to
make the choice between the employee’s religion and his or her job. Senator Kerry said:
“In a Nation founded on freedom of religion, no American should ever have to choose
between keeping a job and keeping faith with their cherished religious beliefs and
traditions.” According to Senator Kerry, the bill “protects the wearing of yarmulkes,
hijabs, turbans and Mormon garments—all the distinctive marks of religious practices, all
the things that people of faith should never be forced to hide.” 177 In relevant part, the
proposed WRFA declares that, under Title VII, it “shall not be considered to be a
reasonable accommodation if the accommodation requires segregation of an employee
from customers or the general public.” 178
The benefit of pursuing a legislative approach is that it requires no judicial
reinterpretation. The body that passed Title VII would clarify to the courts that placing
employees with distinct religious identities in the back in order to resolve the conflict
between the employer’s policies and the employee’s religion is impermissible under Title
VII. If passed, WRFA would leave little question that the employer’s proposed
accommodations in Birdi were insufficient under Title VII.
Yet WRFA, even if passed, would not fully address the problems with the courts’
current interpretation of Title VII, as described herein. Specifically, WRFA does not
prohibit employers from considering customer preference under the statute’s “undue
hardship” analysis for religious discrimination claims. It would, in other words, fail to
stand in the way of a court ruling the same way as the Sambo’s court. 179 While the
proposed Act would require the “undue hardship” safe harbor under Title VII to be read
consistently with the stricter “undue hardship” definition found in the ADA, it is not
certain that this more heightened standard would prohibit employers from invoking
customer preferences as a means to avoid Title VII liability. 180 Accordingly, to more
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fully protect individuals with conspicuous articles of faith, Congress should amend the
bill to state that the actual or perceived loss of business or decline in corporate image
stemming from negative customer reactions to individuals with conspicuous religious
appearances cannot form the basis, in part or in whole, for a finding of an “undue
hardship” under Title VII – even if the meaning of “undue hardship” is derived from the
ADA. The present WRFA is not ideal, it nonetheless promises to bolster Title VII
precisely where courts have struggled to properly fulfill its purpose.
A final note in this section is appropriate before turning to other matters. While
WRFA theoretically would represent an important, though partial, improvement of Title
VII, I acknowledge that Congress has considered—and failed to pass—previous versions
of WRFA for over a decade.181 One civil rights advocate who read a draft of this article
expressed his view in private that Senator Kerry’s introduction of WRFA is more a
symbolic message of the Senator’s personal convictions regarding religious
discrimination in employment rather than a genuine attempt to put forth legislation that
has a chance of amending Title VII. 182 Therefore, my purpose here is not tied specifically
to WRFA or any particular legislation. It is directed at shifting ideas and attitudes with
respect to the religious discrimination so that, whatever efforts are made in this area, they
possess a plausible doctrinal foundation in addition to the necessary will to be accepted.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL IMPLICATIONS OF BANNING WORKPLACE
SEGREGATION
A. The Constitution and Workplace Segregation
Religious discrimination in employment relates not only to the statutory
commands of Title VII, but also to the constitutional protections of the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.183 In particular, plaintiffs with religiously-mandated
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appearances may also seek religious exemptions to neutral, generally applicable
government laws or policies under the First Amendment. Plaintiffs pursuing
constitutional challenges to government laws or policies in the employment context face
an evolving patchwork of standards on the federal and state levels. As a historical matter,
the Free Exercise Clause was read to require an exemption to generally applicable
government policies only if the statute or policy expressly provided for one. 184 In 1963,
however, the Supreme Court issued Sherbert v. Verner, a landmark Free Exercise ruling
in which the Court held that a sincere religious objector 185 is entitled to an exemption
from a generally applicable law that imposes a substantial burden on the individual’s
exercise of his or her religion, unless the law in question survives strict scrutiny. 186 A
substantial burden is generally defined as either compelling an individual to do that
which violates her religious beliefs or prohibiting an individual from that which is
mandated by his or her religious beliefs. 187
In 1990, the Court in Employment Division v. Smith reversed course, eliminating
the presumptive constitutional model and reverting back to the default rule in which an
exemption to generally applicable, facially neutral laws or policies for religious reasons
was required only when the statute itself carved out an exemption. 188 In 1993, in response
to this ruling, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 189
which adopted the 1963 Court’s standard and sought to restore the presumptive
exemption model 190 . In 1997, the Court concluded that RFRA is unconstitutional as
applied to the states, leaving it effective only with respect to the federal government and
the territories. 191
The Court in the seminal Employment Division case was concerned about the
ramifications of ceding to religious exemptions to generally applicable laws in such a
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diverse society. 192 If strict scrutiny is to be applied to one group seeking a religious
exemption, the Court noted, “then it must be applied across the board, to all actions
thought to be religiously commanded.” 193 Given the searching review demanded by strict
scrutiny and the potential for it to be invoked by many groups, “many laws will not meet
the test.” 194 Importantly, the Court added, “[a]ny society adopting such a system would
be courting anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the society's
diversity of religious beliefs.” 195 Our society is “a cosmopolitan nation made up of
people of almost every conceivable religious preference.” 196 To endorse strict scrutiny in
this context, the Court concluded “would open the prospect of constitutionally required
religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.” 197 In
other words, it would “make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law
of the land, and, in effect, to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.” 198
In light of Smith, it is necessary to respond to the Court’s explicit concerns about
the slippery slope of granting religious exemptions in such a diverse society, even though
Smith does not apply to claims pursuant to Title VII. Just as governments will be unable
to effectively implement necessary laws if they are expected to accommodate every
religious individual in need of an exemption, employers will argue that they cannot
accommodate any and all employees or applicants who possess some religious belief that
is expressed through appearance. They may say that the cost of exempting countless
religious employees from general employment policies will amount to anarchy or the
inability to effectively manage the workplace.
At least three responses are appropriate here. First, the belief in Smith that
adopting the compelling interest standard and thus expanding the right of individuals to a
reasonable accommodation will court anarchy is pure speculation. Smith involved a
claim for a religious exemption to laws banning the use of peyote. 199 As one scholar
pointed out, the Court’s concern about the floodgates opening “only makes sense if lots
of religious groups use outlawed drugs, which they do not.” 200 Smith’s parade of
horribles is not grounded in fact or in any reasonable forecast as to an expanded request
192

Smith, 494 U.S. at 888. An early form of this concern was expressed by then-Associate Justice William
H. Rehnquist. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Our
society, consisting of over 200 million individuals of multitudinous origins, customs, tongues, beliefs, and
cultures is, to say the least, diverse. It would hardly take extraordinary ingenuity for a lawyer to find
‘insular and discrete’ minorities at every turn in the road.”). See also Maureen E. Markey, The Price of
Landlord’s “Free” Exercise of Religion: Tenant’s Right to Discriminate – Free Housing and Privacy, 22
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699, 809 n.517 (1995) (listing cases commenting on the extensive religious diversity in
our society).
193
Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id. (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1981))
197
Id.
198
Id. at 872.
199
Employment Div. v. Smith. 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
200
Mark S. Kende, Free Exercise of Religion: A Pragmatic and Comparative Perspective, 55 S.D. L. REV.
412, 416 (2010).

33

to use ceremonial drugs. More broadly, there is no evidence that this heightened
standard, which was the operative standard following Sherbert, led to any identifiable
“anarchy” in religious accommodations outside of the peyote context. 201
Separately, the Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in a case involving
whether a religious accommodation should be granted to an individual who refused to
work on Sundays for religious reasons. 202 The Court entertained the defendants’
contention that the accommodation would result in the collapse of general activities held
on or reserved for Sundays: “What would Sunday be today if professional football,
baseball, basketball, and tennis were barred. Today Sunday is not only a day for religion,
but for recreation and labor. Today the supermarkets are open, service stations dispense
fuel, utilities continue to serve the people and factories continue to belch smoke and
tangible products[.]” 203 The defendants’ posited that “[i]f all Americans were to abstain
from working on Sunday, chaos would result.” 204
The Court stated it was
“unpersuaded… that there will be a mass movement away from Sunday employ” if the
plaintiff were granted the accommodation, as there was “nothing before us in this case to
suggest that Sunday shopping, or Sunday sporting, for that matter, will grind to a halt as a
result of our decision[.]” 205 And so it is here. The Court in Smith did not substantiate its
chaos rationale with any proof that the compelling interest standard and a purported
increase in accommodations would reduce civil society to the whims of religious
individuals or dissolve general order to a situation in which man becomes a law unto
himself. Accordingly, Smith itself should not stand in the way of individuals’ entitlement
to religious accommodations in the employment sector.
Second, the “anarchy” concern in Smith may stem from the Court’s discomfort
with the possibility that unfamiliar and unknown religious groups will come out of the
woodwork and attain exemptions from generally applicable laws. Put more directly by
Professor McConnell in response to Smith’s “courting anarchy” concern, “the Court’s
decision upheld majoritarian values and preserved the ability of the government to ensure
that governmental policy is enforced without the irritant of minority religious
interests.” 206 The Court, Professor McConnell continued, was not “responsive to
minority interests” and instead was more “solicitous of majoritarian values.” 207
I share Professor McConnell’s view that the level of possible comfort with an
individual’s religious appearance, or with the religion itself, should not determine who is
protected by Title VII. In other words, an employee with relatively familiar religious
practices should not be entitled to civil rights safeguards while those with relatively
foreign or exotic religious practices are left outside of the universe of groups that may
201
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have recourse under Title VII. The “courting anarchy” position thus fails additionally
because it promotes majoritarian religious expression at the cost of the less familiar,
though religious nonetheless.
An opposite view would make a religious community’s civil rights protection
contingent or dependent on the degree to which the people are aware or comfortable with
that community. Title VII cannot be translated into a scoreboard of social discomfort.
The solution is not to validate Smith’s unfounded fears about indefinite exemptions to
neutral laws by categorically excluding some very unfamiliar minority religious groups
from the ambit of Title VII protection. Instead, it is to have confidence in the statutory
burden-shifting regime to weed out those claims that are not entitled to an
accommodation and to identify through this filtering process those plaintiffs who the
courts must protect.
Third, there is a greater problem with the religious diversity concerns raised in
Smith, and this problem relates to framing. If discrimination statutes are construed as
embodying distinctions, the Court understandably may be troubled and overwhelmed by
the countless number of distinctions that may follow and that may ostensibly chisel away
at a more established, unified order. One may be less inclined to legitimize a grievance if
it is seen as an outsider’s attempt to receive special recognition or protection. If, however,
plaintiffs construe their claims as abridgments of universally held rights or principles, the
courts and the public may view employers’ attempts to restrict religion-based
appearances as breaching something shared and that impacts all concerned, namely our
nation’s commitment to ensuring every person has the right and ability to practice the
religion of her choosing. Advocates and plaintiffs should reframe civil rights claims,
including those made pursuant to Title VII, as claims protecting shared human rights so
“that infringements of anyone’s rights necessarily may be seen to affect the rights of
everyone else.” 208 The Smith court’s concern may be based on accommodations through
the lens of heterogeneity and the numerous groups that can invoke protective legislation,
rather than the oneness of equality and religious freedom that lie at the heart of civil
rights statutes, including Title VII.
B. Judicial Review and Workplace Segregation
Courts also have reasoned that they should not be in the business of assessing an
employer’s neutral, generally applicable business decisions. 209 This argument suggests
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that employers should have free reign to determine how to run their businesses as long as
their decisions are not made to purposefully inhibit religious minorities. This line of
thinking would likely include decisions based on an employer’s consideration of
customer choice, as every business needs to cater to its client base. Although I have
argued in Part II that customer preference should never justify employment actions that
deny religious rights to an individual, further comment may be in order.
I do not quarrel with the proposition that business decisions should generally rest
with the employer. Title VII, however, vests courts with the limited, though critical,
responsibility to ensure that businesses, however they are run, do not discriminate
illegally. As the Eighth Circuit noted, “employers are free to make their own business
decisions, even inefficient ones, so long as they do not discriminate unlawfully.” 210 That
is, courts are to assess the legality, not the propriety, of employer behavior.
When Title VII was first enacted, some courts were hesitant to intervene in
disputes over generally applicable policies related to appearance. 211 Title VII, they said,
prohibits discrimination “because of” an individual’s religion; generally applicable
policies are not motivated by or directed towards religion. 212 The Supreme Court,
however, has made clear on numerous occasions that Title VII applies to laws that are
facially neutral and generally applicable. The Court, in its own words, “has repeatedly
held that a prima facie Title VII violation may be established by policies or practices that
are neutral on their face and in intent but that nonetheless discriminate in effect against a
particular group.” 213 Accordingly, employer policies governing appearance that impact
210
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religious individuals fall within Title VII’s commands and are thus subject to judicial
review notwithstanding the fact that the policies may be neutral or generally applicable.
Therefore, courts presented with workplace segregation cases are to perform their routine
judicial function by ensuring that employers do not discriminate on the basis of religion,
even when the employer policies in question are non-discriminatory on their face.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article explores employers’ attempts to respond to actual or perceived
preferences of customers by placing employees with conspicuous religious appearances
in areas out of public view or by rejecting applicants with overt religious identities
altogether. This Article challenges these practices, and the court decisions that uphold
them, as inconsistent with Title VII.
There are two primary bases for this opposition. The first speaks to effects. These
practices reinforce majoritarian norms, marginalize individuals following their religious
tenets, establish defined social spaces to which these individuals are restricted, and deny
these individuals meaningful employment opportunities. Put differently, these practices
effectively inform individuals with conspicuous religious that they are categorically
unsuitable for certain employment and the social interactions that public positions
necessarily entail simply because of their appearance, whereas applicants without the
religious appearance are accepted as presumptively fit to be among other co-workers and
the public that the employer serves. Second, the law. These practices cannot be squared
with various legal sources, including the text and purpose of Title VII, federal case law,
and lessons from related contexts, which all point to the view that the law does not permit
employers to segregate individuals with obvious religious identities for customer- or
image-based reasons either in the workplace or from the workforce. Specifically, such
segregation cannot constitute a “reasonable accommodation” under Title VII and
negative customer reactions or the loss of possible business from accommodating the
described employees or applicants cannot give rise to the statute’s “undue hardship” safe
harbor.
In addition, this Article argues in support of legislation that would make clear that
the segregation of individuals with such identities, even if based on customer preferences,
is outside of the bounds of Title VII. Without either the clarification offered in this
Article or legislation that reinforces the strictures of Title VII, courts may continue to
enable employers to both segregate individuals who look differently on account of their
religion and perpetuate stereotypical notions as to the proper physical and social areas to
which the overtly religious belong.
It may be the case that the conspicuously religious, either as a class or particular
unfamiliar subparts, are not accepted by society as deserving certain positions or the
ability to interact fully with the public at large. Such social calculations, infected as they
may be by biases and majoritarian preferences, will, when left alone, direct the roles and
proper places of the religious or the minority. The law, however, commands and compels
otherwise unrestrained social behavior to conform to specific rules and principles. In this
instance and as this Article argues, the law requires that individuals with visible religious
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identities shall be free to occupy certain positions and to mingle with the people -notwithstanding the individuals’ religious appearances or any social aversion thereto.
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